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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT BRIGHAM, by Frank E.
Brigham, Guardian ad litem,
P"laintif!-Appellant,

vs.
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIAATION, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Case No.
11869

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the afternoon of June 28, 1968, Frank Brigham took
his three sons, Scott, age 10, Michael, age 15, and Stephen,
age 12, and a neighbor boy on a trip to look for arrowheads
(Tr. 14). They drove to an area east of Roosevelt near
Fort Duchesne, Utah, where they stayed overnight in Mr.
Brigham's camper (Tr. 15). The following morning they
climbed to the top of a mesa and started looking for arrowheads (Tr. 17). Mr. Brigham and his son Michael were
parallel to each other and Scott was behind Michael. The
other two boys were further back (Tr. 18). They were
walking in a northerly direction with the sun shining behind
them as they walked across the mesa (Tr. 44). The top
of the mesa was a flat, barren piece of terrain (Tr. 45).
Moon Lake had contructed a single phase 7200 volt distribu-
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tion electric line in the area which cut across the mesa in an
east-west direction (Tr. 78). The line consisted of a hot
wire and a ground wire. Scott saw the wires, which were
"silverish" in color (Tr. 38, 175). One pole of the line was
located on the west side of the mesa and another pole
was located on the east side (See defendant's exhibits D-1
through D-8). These poles were 125 feet apart (defendant's
exhibit D-9). Mr. Brigham saw the pole on the west side
of the mesa as he walked under the power line (Tr. 50).
On the morning of June 29, 1968, the pole on the east side
of the mesa was down (Tr. 24). The wires went from the
pole on the west side of the mesa to the insulator on the
downed pole at about a 45° angle (Tr. 175). The wires
didn't touch the ground but went down into the valley
(Tr. 24).
Mr. Bingham heard Michael shout, "Dad!" and he turned
and saw Scott hanging from the wire (Tr. 19). Mr. Brigham ran to Scott, and just as he got to him, Scott fell to the
ground, apparently lifeless (Tr. 20). Mr. Brigham proceeded to give him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and revived him (Tr. 20). Mr. Brigham took Scott to the hospital
in Roosevelt, Utah where he was given emergency treatment and released (Tr. 23).
At the time of the trial, Scott Brigham testified he
could not remember coming to a wire on the mesa (Tr. 174).
During the course of cross-examination, the following testimony was read to Scott from his deposition:
"A (continuing by Mr. Nebeker) Scott, starting on
line twenty-four the reporter transcribed a question
which I asked you and which reads: 'While you were
looking for arrowheads I understand you came across
a pole line, a power pole that was down?'
Your answer: 'I didn't notice the pole, but I saw the
wire.'
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Then I said : 'Where was the wire that you saw? Was
it up in the air or down on the ground?'
Your answer was: It was coming to the ground at
about a forty-five degree angle.' "
Scott stated that he thought the answers given at the
time of the deposition were right (Tr. 175).
Mr. Ernest Ballard, the general manager for Moon
Lake, testified he talked to Scott on the afternoon of June
29, 1968, while he was in his father's. camper in the parking
lot of the Roosevelt Hospital.
Mr. Ballard stated:
"A Okay. As near as I recall Scott indicated that
he saw his older brother pick up a wire and walk under
it and he asked him if it was a hot wire or an electric
wire and got an answer 'no,' and apparently from the
conversation the next thing he had his hand up against
the conductor and he indicated to me that he reached
up and touched the conductor which in this case was
the actual energized conductor rather than the ground
conductor which his brother had just previously
touched and received no problem. I think that's in
essence the conversation. There were other things
talked about, but I have no recollection at this time.''
(Tr. 242)
Mr. Ballard testified the servicemen of Moon Lake
were instructed to constantly inspect the distribution lines in
their area of operation (Tr. 83). He said in two to three
months the servicemen would see most of the distribution line in their particular service area (Tr. 83).
Russ Cramer, the line superintendent for Moon Lake',
testified the company retired approximately 150 poles each
year because of discontinuance of service, road wideni.ng
(Tr. 181-182) or construction projects such as Starvation
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Dam (Tr. 84). These poles are inspected and either put back
in the "store" for reuse or discarded (Tr. 182). This becomes a random system of retirement because they never
know who is going to leave a farm resulting in idle service
(Tr. 85).
Mr. Cramer further testified that he inspected the
transmission lines by aircraft after deer season and after
winter damage (Tr. 181). The distribution lines are inspected by air at more frequent intervals, depending upon
the trouble areas (Tr. 180).
A Mr. Phil Opsal, expert in wood technology and pole
line inspections, testified that in his opinion Moon Lake
had employed a reasonable inspection system (Tr. 221).
The case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. The jury found the defendant negligent and
that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries and also that Scott Brigham was negligent and that
such negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. The
plaintiff took no exception to the form of the verdict. Based
upon the answers to interrogatories, the court instructed
the Clerk to enter a verdict of no cause of action (Tr. 255).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Since the jury found the defendant negligent, Point I
of plaintiff's brief is moot. Any error in the instructions
cannot be prejudicial because the jury found the defendant
negligent.
The only issue on this appeal is whether the trial court
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properly instructed the jury on the question of contributory negligence and whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the finding of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The court submitted the following instructions on contributory negligence:
"Instruction No. 7
Persons in the position of plaintiff Scott Brigham
at the time of the event in question are under a duty
to make reasonable observations to learn the conditions confronting him and to take reasonable measures
to observe and avoid dangers confronting him. What
observations he should make and what he should do for
his own safety while thus proceeding are matters the
law does not attempt to regulate in detail and for all
occasions, except in this respect: It places upon him
the continuing duty to exercise the care an ordinary
prudent person would observe to avoid an accident,
under the circumstances then existing. Failure to discharge that duty would constitute negligence." (R.
153)
"Instruction No. 8
"A child is not bound to exercise the same degree
of care for his safety that is required of an adult. While
there is no inflexible rule or standard in terms of years
which can be laid down as a guide for determining the
question of negligence on the part of a child, the law
requires of a child that degree of care and caution
which is ordinarily exercised by children of the same
age, intelligence, capacity, and experience, under the
circurnstances then existing." (R. 154)

The plaintiff did not except to the court's instructions
on contributory negligence. Having failed to except, they

should not be allowed to claim error on their appeal.

Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
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"* * * No party may assign as error the giving or the

failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grounds of his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may review the
giving or failure to give an instruction. * * *"

Although the rule does allow the review of the giving
or failure to give an instruction, this court has been reluctant to do so where the party claiming error failed to make
a proper exception. See Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R. Co., 118 U. 20, 218 P.2d 685. (1950).
This court has held that a jury may find a minor child
guilty of contributory negligence. In Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964), a sixyear-old plaintiff was riding on a sleigh when he was struck
by defendant motorist. The jury found adversely to the
plaintiff. This court affirmed the lower court verdict for
defendant, stating:
"We ai·e in accord with the idea that a child is
not expected to have the maturity of judgment nor
the capacity to cope with danger that an adult would
have and consequently, is not held to the adult standard
of care. Nevertheless, a child even of this age has some
duty of care for his own safety, and if he fails to observe it can be guilty of contributory negligence. The
requirement is that he exercise that degree of care
which ordinarily would be observed by children of the
same age, intelligence and experience under similar
circumstances." Id. at 185, 397 P.2d at 991. (Emphasis
added)
The general rule applicable to the situation in the case
at bar is stated in 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Electricity §75, pp. 281282 (1966) :
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"Usually the question of contributory negligence
actions for injuries to infants by coming in contact with a wire charged with electricity is held to be
for the jury, especially where the contact with the wire
was accidental, or the child was mistaken as to the
nature of the wire and no shock was anticipated or the
circumstances were such as to lead the child to believe
that no serious harm would result * * * However, the
age, knowledge and experience of a particular infant
may be such that his conduct in voluntarily coming in
contact with a live wire can be declared negligent by
the court, especially where the opportunity for contact
with the wire is not presented to one using the premises
or the street in an ordinary way." See also 69 A.L.R.
2d 51, §11 (1960). (Emphasis added)
.

in
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This court has held that contributory negligence of an
adult may bar recovery against an electric company for
personal injuries caused by electrical transformers. Koch
v. Telluride Power Co., 116 Utah 237, 209 P.2d 241 (1949).
Cases in other jurisdictions have indicated that children
injured by electricity may be precluded from recovery by
their contributory negligence. Driver v. Potomac Electric
Power Company, 247 Md. 75, 230 A.2d 321 (1967) (17-yearold boy injured when well-drilling rig hit electric transmission line) ; Jones v. Kentucky Utilities Company, 334
S.W. 2d 263, 265 (1960) (15-year-old boy electrocuted while
climbing and walking on top of a bridge) ; Hamilton v.
Southern Nevada Power Co., 273 P.2d 760 (Nev. 1954)
(16-year-old boy injured when pipe hit power line); Brush
v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E.
2d 83 (1939) (14-year-old boy injured on transformer);
Hanson v. Washington Water Power Company, 165 Wash.
497, 5 P.2d 1025 (1931) (11-year-old child climbing fence
and tower of electricity).
Defendant contends that Section 54-7-22, Utah Code
Annotated, (Rep. Vol. 1953) cited in plaintiff's brief dO:s
not alter the existing law regarding the duty of electnc
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companies, that it does not abolish the defense of contributory negligence, and, therefore, is not in point.
Initially, it should be pointed out that plaintiffs did
not plead the statute in their complaint as required by Rule
9 (i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It was not discussed at the time of the pretrial and was not incorporated
in the pretrial order (R. 81-82). It was never mentioned
during the course of the two-day trial in Vernal, Utah.
In any event, the statute does not abrogate the defense
of contributory negligence. It states that the utility will be
liable only if such injury or damage is "caused thereby or
result(s) therefrom." If the injury or damage was caused
or contributed to by the negligent acts or omissions of the
plaintiff, then clearly there could be no recovery.

The jury did find the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of his injuries. Such a finding was based on proper
instructions, and on substantial evidence.
POINT II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.
In Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 368, 412 P.2d
451, 453 (1966) this Court stated the following with respect
to verdicts by a jury:
"Due to its acknowledged prerogatives, its advantaged position, and the desirability of safeguarding the
integrity of the jury system the courts are and should
be reluctant to interfere with a jury verdict and will
not do so as long as there is any reasonable bases in
the evidence to justify it."
Respondent respectfully urges that there was a reasonable and substantial basis upon which the jury could
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have found the plaintiff contributorily negligent. The uncontroverted evidence in the record is that on the morning
of the accident the day was clear and that the sun was shining (Tr. 40). Plaintiff's father testified the transmission
wires had a silvery appearance (Tr. 45). There was also
testimony that the top of the mesa where plaintiff was at
the time of the accident was flat and that the brush thereon
was relatively low (Tr. 45). The wires were apparently
five to five and one half feet off the ground where Scott
received the electrical shock (Tr. 30). Plaintiff's father
indicates that when he first noticed plaintiff seconds after
the accident, plaintiff was "hanging from his right hand" on
the wires and plaintiff's left foot was touching the ground
(Tr. 19).
A jury, on basis of all this evidence, could reasonably
have concluded that the line on which plaintiff was injured
was clearly visible to a ten-year-old boy. The fact that these
particular lines had a silvery, aluminum-type appearance
could be found to have given reasonable warning to a boy of
plaintiff's age that the lines were dangerous. The position
of the plaintiff immediately after the accident, namely,
hanging from his right hand on the wires, could have
led a reasonable jury to find that plaintiff had negligently grabbed an activated wire which was clearly visible
to him.
In addition, the aforementioned Mr. Ballard testified
of a conversation he had with plaintiff on the day of the
accident. That testimony was as follows :
" ... Scott indicated that he saw his older brother
pick up a wire and walk under it and he asked him if
it was a hot wire or an electric wire and got an answer
"no," and apparently from the conversation the next
thing he had his hand up against the conductor and
he indicated to me that he reached up and touched the
conductor which in this case was the actual energized
conductor rather than the ground conductor which his

10
brother had just previously touched and received no
problem." (Tr. 242)
The jury could have found from this testimony that
plaintiff, despite his youth, recognized the general danger
of electric wires, and specifically recognized the possibility
that these wires might be hot. The jury might also have
found that even though his brother, Michael, was not
electrocuted when he touched the ground conductor that
plaintiff was not excused from touching the other conductor
which was energized. The mere fact that Michael was not
hurt when he negligently touched the ground conductor
could reasonably have been found not to justify plaintiff's
negligent and voluntary touching of the second, energized
wire.
Further evidence from which a reasonable finding of
contributory negligence could be based is the testimony of
plaintiff contained in his deposition. On cross-examination
plaintiff had some difficulty remembering the events at
the time of the accident. Counsel for defendant attempted
to refresh plaintiff's memory by reading from the deposition:
"Question (continuing by Mr. Nebeker) Scott,
starting on line twenty-four [page 9] the reporter
transcribed a question which I asked you and which
reads: 'While you were looking for arrowheads I
understand you came across a pole line, a power pole
that was down?'
Your answer: 'I didn't notice the pole, but I saw
the wire.'
Then I said: 'Where was the wire that you saw?
Was it up in the air or down on the ground?'
Your answer was: 'It was coming to the ground
at about a forty-five degree angle." (Tr. 175)
Although Scott could not remember giving these an-
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swers at the time of the trial, he did agree that his memory
of the accident might have been better at the time of the
than it was at the time of trial (Tr. 176). The
could have accepted Scott's testimony from his deposition that he saw the wire. They could also have found that
he touched it when he knew or should have known that it
was dangerous.
Respondent contends there was ample evidence indicating that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that
a jury could so conclude. Because of this evidence the finding of contributory negligence by the jury should not be
disturbed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON DEFENDANT'S DUTY.
The jury found the defendant negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
In view of this finding, any error in the court's instruction
on defendant's duty cannot be prejudicial. However defendant contends the trial court properly instructed the jury
on defendant's duty. The court instructed the jury that the
defendant Moon Lake was required to take exceptional precautions to prevent an injury from its electrical transmission line:
"Instruction No. 6
One who has under his control an instrumentality
exceptionally dangerous in character is bound to take
exceptional precautions to prevent an injury being
done by the instrumentality. The degree of care must
be equal to the degree of danger involved. A high
voltage electric transmission line is an exceptionally
dangerous instrumentality and distributors of electricity maintaining such lines are under a corresponding duty to protect the public from danger therefrom.
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In this connection such a distributor is obliged to
observe due care:
( 1) To cause reasonable inspection to be made
of such transmission lines, including supporting structures, to discover defects or dangerous conditions
therein existing.
(2) To repair or remove dangerous conditions it
knows to exist or of which it should know by exercise
of due care.
(3) To cause reasonable warning to be given
persons in the position of plaintiffs of dangerous conditions of which it knows, or should know by the exercise of due care, but which are not known to them.
Failure of such distributor to act in accordance
with the foregoing would constitute negligence on its
part." (R. 152)

The plaintiff's failed to except to this instruction. Plaintiff's failure to except to the instruction as required by Rule
51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, precludes them from
claiming error on this instruction.
The State of Utah is committed to the general rule
that an electric company is required to exercise a high degree of care. In the case of Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the
administratrix of a deceased workman's estate sued the
defendant electric company for the death of decedent. The
trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant and
this court affirmed. This court stated the electric company
was obliged to meet a high standard of care:
"The defendant in this case was engaged as a
public utility in furnishing electric power to a large
number of customers. It was furnished various persons
under different and peculiar circumstances. In all cases
it is required to exercise the degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence would under the circum-
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stances. It is well known that one dealing with
electricity deals with a force of dangerous character
and that there is a constant risk of injury to person or
property if not properly controlled. The care observed
must be commensurate with and proportionate to the
danger. Therefore, the defendant company was obliged
to meet a high standard of care, which was greater in
some cases than another depending on the exigency of
the service rendered." Id. at 282-283, 365 P.2d at 791
(Emphasis added).
All jurisdictions considering the question have held
electric companies are not liable for injuries unless guilty
of a wrongful act:
"Electrical companies are not insurers of the safety
of the public or of those whose occupation is likely to
bring them into dangerous contact with their appliances, and hence are not liable for injuries unless guilty
of some wrongful act or omission." 29 C.J.S. Electricity
§38, p. 1057 (1965) (Emphasis added).
Cases from 34 jurisdictions are cited as authority for
the above proposition. Id. at pp. 1057-1058.
The following cases illustrate the standard of care
applicable to power companies. In Roos v. Consumers Public Power District, 171 Neb. 563, 106 N.W.2d 871 (1961),
plaintiff sued the defendant power company for damages
allegedly sustained when a power line broke. Plaintiff alleged the defendant had failed to make proper inspection
of the lines. The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed a
lower Court decision adverse to the electric company. The
Court held:
"A power company engaged in the transmission
of electricity is required to exercise reasonable care in
the construction and maintenance of its lines. The degree of care varies with the circumstances, but it must
be commensurate with the dangers involved, and where
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wires are designed to carry electricity of high voltage,
the law imposes upon the company the duty of exercising the utmost care and prudence consistent with the
practical operation of its business to avoid injury to
persons and property [citations]. Electric companies
are not insurers of the safety of the public and hence
are not liable for injuries unless guilty of some wrongful act or omission [citation]." 106 N.W. 2d at 876
In Dillard v. Southwestern Public Service Company,
73 N.M. 40, 385 P.2d 564 (1963) plaintiff, an operator on
an oil well servicing truck, sued the defendant utility for
personal injuries incurred when the mast of the well came
into contact with a power line. The lower Court granted
defendant's. motion for summary judgment and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico affirmed, indicating with approval an
earlier case wherein it was stated:
". . . the correct measure of care owed by one
handling high-power electrical current [is] to be the
exercise of a degree of care in the construction and
maintenance of its lines 'commensurate with the danger to be apprehended ... but they are not insurers
against accidents or injuries.'" 385 P.2d at 566.
And in Foote v. Scott--New Madrid-Mississippi Electric Coop., 359 SW 2d 40 (Mo. App. 1962) the parents of a
sixteen year old boy brought an action for wrongful death
against defendant. The evidence indicated the boy threw
a copper wire attached to a tin can over an electric power
line and was electrocuted. The appellate court reversed a
trial court judgment for plaintiff. The Court held:
" . . . although, the judicial declarations in this
jurisdiction have firmly fixed and uniformly adhered
to the utmost or highest degree of care as the required
standard, it is perfectly plain that here, as elsewhere
[citation], an electric company is not an insurer of the
safety of persons and property, and that its liability
vel non in a given situation is determinable upon prin-
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ciples of negligence." Id. at 43. See also Eastern Shore
Public Service Company v. Corbett, 277 Md. 411, 177
A.2d 701, 709 (1962) ; Alabama Power Company v.
King, 190 So. 2d 674, 679 (Ala. 1966) ; Hercules Powder
Company v. Di Sabatino, 188 A.2d 529, 533 (1963).
Counsel for respondent have been unable to find any
American case holding an electric company strictly liable
for damages under either an ultrahazardous activity or
product liability theory. The Cornucopia Gold Mines v.
Locken, 150 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 326 U.S. 763
(1945) case referred to in App€llant's Brief (pp. 7-8) sets a
negligence standard for power companies, and does not depart from the general rule.
The trial court's instruction regarding defendant's duty
is a clear statement of the law and fully covered plaintiff's
allegations of negligence.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to try their case on
one theory in the trial court, and having lost, try another
theory in this court. This is particularly true where they
took no exceptions to the court's instructions. The trial court
properly instructed the jury on the issue of contributory
negligence. The jury found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence and that such negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. This finding was based on
substantial evidence. The judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed.
ResP€ctfully submitted,
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